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Abstract
We present a formal model of haggling between a name-your-own-price retailer
and a set of individual buyers. Rather than posting a price, the retailer waits for
potential buyers to submit oﬀers for a given product and then chooses to either
accept or reject them. Consumers whose oﬀers have been rejected can invest in
additional haggling eﬀort and increment their oﬀers. The main advantage of this
pricing model is that it allows the name-your-own-price retailer to engage in price
discrimination: as haggling is costly for the potential buyer, customers with a high
willingness to haggle will achieve lower transaction prices. Thus, haggling eﬀort can
be used as a self-selection mechanism to implement price discrimination. Our study
is motivated by several name-your-own-price retailers that have recently emerged
on the Internet. Based on detailed transaction data of a large German name-yourown-price retailer, we present a model of consumer haggling. We then show how
this model can be used to improve the decision making of the retailer, who needs
to choose a threshold price above which all oﬀers are accepted. Another decision
variable for the retailer lies in the user interface design, which allows the retailer to
either facilitate or to hinder the haggling of the consumer.
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Introduction

The emergence of the Internet and its extensive usage for electronic commerce has given
companies the opportunity to experiment with a number of innovative pricing models.
A well-known example for this is the name-your-own-price (NYOP) model and, more
generally, the concept of online haggling. In the NYOP setting, instead of posting a price,
the seller waits for an oﬀer by the potential buyer that she can then either accept or reject.
Historically, haggling over prices was the common mode of doing business in the western
world, and it is still common practice in pre-industrial societies today. When in 1653
George Fox, the founder of Quakerism, proposed the radical notion that everyone should
pay the same price for the same good, his proposal was by and large ignored. Two
hundred years later, Aristide Boucicaut introduced fixed prices at his Paris dry goods
shop, Bon Marché. The innovation quickly diﬀused and was adopted by the first new
mass retailers in the United States, managed by R. H. Macy and F. W. Woolworth, and J.
Wanamaker, who were rapidly replacing the small owner-operated stores. Given the size
and organizational structure of these new retailers, store owners had to rely on clerks to
interact with customers. This created three important advantages of fixed prices relative to
the existing practice of haggling. First, in absence of posted prices, the owner of the retail
store had to provide detailed instructions to his clerks on how to conduct the haggling
process, requiring extensive training. Second, the capacity of the clerk in checking out
customers was constrained by the lengthy haggling for every transaction, requiring the
owner to hire additional clerks. Third, principal-agent problems between owner and clerk
required close supervision and monitoring.
These disadvantages have lead to the almost complete extinction of haggling in retail
settings in most industrialized societies. However, all three of these eﬀects can be dramatically reduced in electronic markets. Instead of having clerks haggle with customers,
the firm can create an electronic agent that receives oﬀers from the customer and then
considers autonomously which oﬀers to accept and which to reject. The main advantage
of this approach is that it allows the seller to engage in price discrimination: as haggling
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is costly for the potential buyer, customers with a high willingness to haggle will achieve
lower transaction prices. Thus, haggling eﬀort can be used as a price discrimination mechanism, which - under broad circumstances - leads to higher profits compared to a uniform,
posted price.
Unlike some early claims of the business press, predicting that the NYOP-model will
soon replace fixed retail prices1 , we doubt that the pendulum of economic history will
swing back completely towards an economy of collateral bargaining. Nevertheless, the
relative ease of transacting in electronic markets will make haggling attractive for market
environments currently relying purely on posted prices. This has been most visible in
the emergence of several new price intermediaries, including Priceline.com, which has
implemented a NYOP model for selling airline tickets, new vehicles, long distance calls,
and home loans. In this article, we present a formal model of the haggling process between
consumers and a German NYOP retailer. The NYOP retailer we study is an intermediary
between a wholesaler and consumers. In our setting, the wholesaler set a wholesale price
at which products are sold to the intermediary, and the intermediary sets a threshold price
for consumer oﬀers. The consumer submits an oﬀer which is accepted if it exceeds the
threshold price.
We begin our analysis by proposing a consumer haggling model. Consumers incur
haggling eﬀort for every oﬀer they submit to the NYOP retailer. When making an oﬀer, a
consumer balances the cost of oﬀering too much, leading to an extensive information rent
for the seller, with the cost of oﬀering too little, leading to additional or wasted haggling
cost. After establishing an appropriate consumer model, we turn to the problem faced by
the NYOP retailer. The retailer’s problem is to determine a threshold price above which it
accepts the consumer oﬀer. In addition to these tactical decisions, the retailer also needs
to decide to what extent he should hinder or facilitate the haggling of the consumer.
The proprietary data set we built based on our collaboration with the German NYOP
retailer together with our analytical results allows us to make the following contributions:
1

“Haggling goes High-Tech”, April 10, 2000, Wall Street Journal
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• First, we model the consumer haggling process using a stochastic dynamic programming formulation (Proposition 1) and illustrate its predictive power based on the
transaction data we obtained from the German NYOP retailer.
• Second, we derive the profit maximizing threshold price (Proposition 2) and show
how it compares with the threshold prices that were used by the retailer we studied.
Based on the consumer data we collected, we also show that our optimal threshold
price would have increased retailer profits substantially.
• Third, we discuss under what conditions haggling can be advantageous compared to
posted prices. We find that if consumers are very heterogeneous concerning valuation
and haggling ability, haggling can lead to higher profits compared to posted prices
(Proposition 3). However, this was only the case for 1 out of 3 products we studied.
At the higher level, the main advantage of haggling is that it allows the wholesaler to
complement sales from traditional retail channels with sales from the NYOP channel
that has on average lower transaction prices. However, since the NYOP retailer never
posts a price, these additional sales do not necessarily come at the expense of lower
sales at the higher posted price.
• Finally, we show how changes in the required eﬀort to increment an oﬀer influences
consumer haggling, which leads to interesting observations concerning the NYOP
interface design (Proposition 4).

2

An NYOP Application

All NYOP applications attempt to discriminate consumers according to their willingness
to pay, yet there exist diﬀerent ways this price discrimination is implemented. A closer
look at Priceline’s business model across product categories reveals two methods of price
discrimination. In the first method, potential buyers place oﬀers on a product, facing
uncertainty about some of the product’s attributes. For example, customers placing oﬀers
for air travel face uncertainty about the detailed travel schedule and do not know which
4

carrier will fulfill their demand. This allows Priceline to screen consumers according to
their type, while allowing airlines to serve customers that they were previously not able
to distinguish from less price sensitive customers. In general, this price discrimination
method works well for multi-attribute products, which are fairly close substitutes (air
travel, hotel accommodation).
Priceline uses a diﬀerent method of price discrimination for the sales of undiﬀerentiated
goods. Here, Priceline uses haggling eﬀort - representing consumer eﬀort and time loss
from the online haggling process - as a way to discriminate between consumers. For
example, a consumer placing an oﬀer for calling capacity can start with a low oﬀer and
then — upon being rejected after a 60 second wait period — increment the oﬀer. Priceline
allows customers to submit 3 consecutive oﬀers for the same phone number and capacity
before barring customers to submit additional oﬀers for 24 hours. While this approach
can lead to an attractive price for the consumer, the consumer needs to invest in haggling
eﬀort (extra oﬀers) to realize a lower price. As price sensitive consumers are more likely
to tolerate such disutility, price discrimination is achieved.
Research Setting
The research site underlying this study uses this second method of price discrimination.
Figure 1 describes in detail how a consumer interacts with this NYOP retailer. After
providing an identification (or registering as a new user), the consumer makes an oﬀer for
a product. The retailer then compares the oﬀer with an internal threshold price. If the
oﬀer exceeds the threshold, the transaction occurs at the price oﬀered by the consumer. If
the oﬀer is below the threshold, the consumer is informed that her oﬀer was too low and
is given the opportunity to submit an incremented oﬀer after a certain delay period.
The NYOP set-up we study brings together three perspectives: those of the consumer,
the retailer, and the wholesaler. We illustrate these diﬀerent perspectives based on an
example of a hypothetical consumer X, who is interested in buying a personal digital
assistant (PDA). Consumer X has seen a posted price of 222 Euro for the product at a
large computer discounter. However, she is not willing to spend this amount. For the

5

sake of argument, assume her willingness to pay is 200 Euro. Consumer X is aware of
the NYOP channel and expects to find the exact product there at a lower price. She is
uncertain though how much lower this price would be. For this reason, she first submits an
oﬀer of 155 Euro, and - upon being notified that her oﬀer has been rejected - increments
the oﬀer further to 173, 186, and 196 Euro. At this point, she is informed by the NYOP
retailer that her oﬀer has been accepted and receives the product for 196 Euro.
Second, consider the perspective of the wholesaler. The wholesaler has traditionally
relied on posted price retailers, who have purchased the product from the wholesaler at
a wholesale price of 193 and marked the product up to the 222 Euro mentioned above.
Instead of lowering the price in the hope of attracting more customers, the wholesaler
can use the NYOP channel to reach people like consumer X who currently abstain from
purchasing. At the same time, the eﬀort required for haggling with the NYOP retailer
limits the cannibalization between channels.
Finally, consider the position of the NYOP retailer, who acts as an intermediary between
consumers and the wholesaler. The intermediary receives oﬀers from consumers and needs
to determine a threshold price above which he is willing to accept an oﬀer from the
consumer. In the case of the Palm IIIc, this threshold was 193 Euro. A successful oﬀer
from the consumer, e.g. the oﬀer of 196 of consumer X, will lead to two sources of profit.
First, the intermediary obtains an information rent, the spread between the submitted
oﬀer and the threshold price (196-193=3 Euro). Second, if the NYOP retailer chooses a
threshold price above the wholesale price, he also obtains an additional profit, consisting
of the threshold price minus wholesale price. The NYOP retailer we studied decided to
set the threshold price equal to the wholesale price and thus relied on the information rent
as the source of profits.
In addition to setting the threshold price, the NYOP retailer also has control over the
user interface design. Specifically, he can influence the haggling eﬀort of the consumer via
the amount of information the consumer has to key in for every oﬀer. The NYOP retailer
also chooses the time delay between receiving an oﬀer and informing the consumer about
the outcome of the oﬀer, which directly impacts the consumer’s haggling eﬀort. In our
6

research setting, consumers were informed after five minutes about the outcome of their
oﬀer.
Research Questions
Motivated by our interactions with this German NYOP retailer, we seek to answer the
following two questions:
(1) How should the NYOP retailer set the threshold price, above which he accepts oﬀers
submitted by consumers?
(2) To what extent should the haggling eﬀort from the consumer be increased or decreased via the interface design and feedback mechanisms of the haggling process?
In addition to these two questions that are geared directly to improve decision making
at the NYOP retailer, we are also interested in the modeling the consumer haggling process
as well as in comparing retailer profits of an NYOP retailer with profits obtained for a
traditional posted price setting.
Data Collection and Research Methodology
For the purpose of our research, the German NYOP retailer provided us with a complete
history of submitted oﬀers as well as with information about the corresponding threshold
prices. In addition we obtained the corresponding customer identifications, which allows
us to link the oﬀers a consumer makes for a given product into a sequence of oﬀers for
this consumer and this product. Such sequences of oﬀers are the unit of analysis in our
research.
Our analysis is based on several consumer electronic products that were oﬀered at our
research site in May 2001. We collected data for a personal digital assistant (BP DA = 246
oﬀers, NP DA = 46 haggling sequences), a CD-rewriter (BCDR = 365 oﬀers, NCDR =
63 haggling sequences), and a DVD-Player (BDV D = 363 oﬀers, NDV D = 45 haggling
sequences).
We use these data in the two ways. First, we used the haggling sequences for each
product to validate our consumer model. This will be discussed in Section 4. Second, we
divided the set of haggling sequences for each product into a calibration sample and a hold7

out sample. The hold-out sample was then used to evaluate the performance of our optimal
threshold derived in Proposition 3 and to compare it with the actual profits obtained by
the NYOP retailer. This will be discussed in Section 5. A potential shortcoming of our
study is that our sample is limited to consumer’s who have incurred the eﬀort of registering
at the NYOP retailer, which could lead to a sample selection bias. This limits our ability
to generalize our findings to the entire consumer population.

3

Related Literature

The NYOP setting we study relates to existing literature on auctions as well as bargaining. This research typically assumes that decision makers are currently making optimal
decisions at equilibrium and know that others are doing the same and that best decision
responses will be made (Rubinstein 1982).
Consider the literature on auctions (Klemperer 1999) and their application to electronic
commerce (Pinker et al. 2002) first. Auction theory is concerned with the eﬃcient allocation of a scarce good. Sellers are typically interested in an auction mechanism that yields
the highest price for this scarce good and research has focused on optimal auction design
and comparison of diﬀerent types of auctions. A famous result, known as the revenue
equivalence theorem, states that for the four independent private value auctions (first
price, second price, English, and Dutch auction) the expected revenue for the seller is
identical. This result is driven by the bidders “competing” for the purchase of the scarce
good. However, in the context we study, the seller does not face a supply constraint. Over
the one year interaction we had with the retailer, there was not a single case in which a
consumer who had submitted an oﬀer above the threshold price was not rewarded with
the product. Another diﬀerence that our research context has with most of the auction research is the standard assumption made in the analysis of auctions that there are no costs
associated with submitting a bid. Typically, it is assumed that in open bid auctions, each
bidder in turn submits a bid equal to the previous bid plus the minimum bid increment
unless the resulting bid would be higher than her valuation, in which case she exits. Such
8

an approach is not optimal if the bidder incurs a cost for every bid she places (Daniel and
Hirshleifer 1998). Taken together these two observations, we conclude that our setting
does not correspond to an auction. For this reason, we refer to the prices submitted by
consumers as “oﬀers” as opposed to “bids”.
Next, consider the relationship between our research setting and models of bargaining.
Bargaining refers to situations where (i) individuals have the possibility of concluding a
mutually beneficial agreement, (ii) there is a conflict of interests about which agreement to
conclude, and (iii) no agreement may be imposed on any individual without his approval
(Osborne and Rubinstein 1990). Bargaining was originally formalized using an axiomatic
approach, which has become known as the Nash Bargaining Problem (Nash 1950). Using
the notion of extensive games Rubinstein (1982) was the first to formulate bargaining
through a procedural approach in which players make decisions sequentially in a prespecified order. One key determinant of the outcome in many bargaining models is the
cost of impatience or delay. In our model, this corresponds to the consumer’s haggling
cost.
In the setting we study, the seller uses a common threshold price for all consumers and
does not change this threshold price over the course of the haggling sequence. This reflects
legal constraints from German trade laws at the time of our study (“Rabattgesetze”)2 and
the fear of the NYOP retailer that treating consumers diﬀerently might be perceived as
unfair3 .
2

Over the last two years, the laws have been interpreted diﬀerently in diﬀerent cases, leading to a some-

what ambiguous legal basis. One major price intermediary was found guilty of illegal price discrimination
which resulted significant legal costs and, more importantly, severe damage to the firm’s brand name.
The Rabattgesetze were eliminated in the summer of 2001, making online haggling possible from a legal
perspective. However, within the time-span of our research cooperation, the site had not yet implemented
such additional price discrimination.
3
Applying diﬀerent threshold prices or response times could, if detected, create to perceptions of
unfairness from the public. Such a case was experienced by Amazon.com when the firm charged higher
prices for DVDs to more loyal customers (in an attempt to leverage their frictional cost advantage).
However, customers discovered that they had paid more for the same product than other customers at the
same point in time, leading to major negative publicity for the company. Amazon.com ultimately ended
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Given a constant threshold price, the bargaining problem corresponds to a game, in
which the seller chooses the threshold price and members of the consumer population
choose their oﬀering sequences. However, even with this simplification, a characterization
of the resulting equilibrium is almost impossible to achieve in practice, as it involves multiple parties with private information. Already, solutions to relatively simple bargaining
problems often oﬀer multiple equilibria. The number of possible solutions can be further
multiplied when mixed strategies are applied (Kennan and Wilson 1993). For example,
Rubinstein’s full information bargaining problem of dividing a pie of 1 between 2 players
can be shown to have one perfect equilibrium. However, multiple equilibria arise, if the pie
is an amount of money denominated in discrete units (van Damme et al. 1990). Sutton
(1986) illustrates that Rubinstein’s game does also not provide a unique equilibrium when
a third player is introduced.
The mathematical complexity of bargaining models further increases if one considers
multiple agents. Since, in our setting, the NYOP retailer has to choose a common threshold
price for all consumers, strategic consumers would take each others action into account
when submitting oﬀers. Bargaining settings with many agents require that each agent has
some knowledge about each other’s private information. The typical assumption is that
each agent’s valuation follows a certain distribution function. In other words, the actual
realization is unknown to an agent, however, the distribution of the random variable is
common knowledge (see for example Mailath and Postlewaite 1990a; 1990b). Thus, in
order to formulate an equilibrium model, we would have to obtain data not only on the
private information about each consumer, but also about the consumers’ believes about
the private information of others.
In addition to the mathematical complexity associated with a bargaining equilibrium
model in our setting, the assumption of the auction and bargaining literature that every
decision maker already acts optimally is diﬃcult to combine with the objective of advising
decision makers on how to improve their actions. In a recent editorial of Marketing Science,
up publicly apologizing and refunding all customers who had paid higher prices.
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Steven Shugan, editor-in-chief of Marketing Science, provides a thoughtful discussion about
the diﬀerent perspectives of equilibrium models on the one hand and models geared towards
decision support and improvement on the other hand. As Shugan observes: “It is diﬃcult
to advise players who already act optimally or to explore improvements at equilibrium. [..]
Given this argument, we might ask when is it appropriate to assume optimal behavior. The
answer is the same as with any other assumption. An assumption is appropriate when
it provides a good approximation within the context of the research objective (Shugan
2002).”
The objective of this research, as stated in our research questions above, is to improve the decisions from the NYOP retailer. Given this objective, we need to make two
simplifying assumptions. First, we restrict the decision space of the NYOP retailer to
constant threshold prices. This reflects legal constraints and the need for a “fair process”
discussed above. Second, we assume that the consumer “lumps together” the various
forms of uncertainty she faces (product valuations of other consumers, beliefs of other
consumers, wholesale price) into a single distribution over the NYOP retailer’s threshold
price. This reduces the parameters required to describe a consumer substantially enabling
us to perform econometric analysis.
Based on these two assumptions, consumer haggling becomes a problem of search. The
consumer balances search eﬀort, which is minimized if she only submits one oﬀer, with
obtaining a price that lies only slightly above the threshold price, which is achieved if she
submits many oﬀers with small increments.
Consumer models of search have been analyzed extensively in the economic literature.
As pointed out by Stigler (1961), consumers trade-oﬀ their disutility of search with potential price savings resulting from gathering price information. While Stigler considered a
model of consumer search across multiple sellers, the qualitative eﬀect of search on pricing
is similar: firms are able to charge above marginal costs as long as the cost of obtaining
price information is non-zero. Following Stigler, several papers (Salop and Stiglitz 1976;
Varian 1980; Bakos 1997) examine the eﬀect of consumer search costs on pricing behavior
of producers. Models of consumer search have been used repeatedly in empirical stud11

ies of consumer behavior in electronic commerce settings. In a related paper (Hann and
Terwiesch 2001), we use a consumer search model to estimate the consumer’s disutility of
making a single oﬀer in the context described above. For the average consumer, the disutility of making or incrementing a single oﬀer (haggling cost) was found to be equivalent
to about 5.5 Euro for a 200 Euro product (1 Euro=0.9 US$ at the time of the study).

4

The Consumer Model

A consumer making an oﬀer on a product featured at the NYOP retailer faces the following
decision. If the oﬀer she makes in the current round is lower than the unknown threshold
price held by the retailer, she incurs haggling costs, but does not receive any direct reward.
However, an unsuccessful oﬀer does provide additional information, which is valuable for
the consumer if she decides to continue the haggling process. If the oﬀer she makes is
higher than the threshold price, the consumer realizes a reward consisting of the diﬀerence
between her valuation of the product and her oﬀer. Despite this reward, the consumer
now knows that she is likely to have paid too much and thereby left an extra profit margin
to the retailer.
Dynamic Programming Formulation
In the following model formulation, we assume that the consumer’s utility function is
additive in haggling eﬀort and potential price savings. We also assume that the consumer
is risk neutral and that her haggling costs do not change within the course of a haggling
sequence. Define c as the cost for the consumer of making (incrementing) one oﬀer.
Moreover, let T be the - to the consumer unknown - threshold price. A consumer initially
assumes that T is a random variable distributed over [Rmin , Rmax ].
A consumer with a reservation price r submits an oﬀer x ∈ [Rmin , R∗ ], where R∗ =
min (r, Rmax ). If x ≥ T, the oﬀer is successful and the consumer receives the product,
realizing a surplus of r − x − c. However, if x < T , the oﬀer is rejected. In this case,
the consumer can either terminate the haggling process or continue it by incrementing her
oﬀer and incurring additional haggling cost c.
12

If the consumer decides to make a new oﬀer, her information about the threshold price
T has improved to an interval of [x, Rmax ]. Given the nature of the updating process
resulting in a two-side truncated prior distribution for T and an overall high level of
uncertainty about T , we assume that T is uniformly distributed over the corresponding
interval. Below, we will show that a consumer model with this assumption provides a
good fit with the data we collected from the German name-your-own-price retailer.
In order to model the behavior of a consumer described by the set of characteristics
(c, Rmin , Rmax , r), we consider the optimal expected incremental surplus V (x) earned by a
consumer whose last oﬀer x was rejected. The dynamic programming optimality equation
for V (x) can be expressed as:
V (x) = max 0, max ∗ −c +
x≤y≤R

where

y−x
Rmax −x

y−x
(r − y) +
Rmax − x

Rmax − y
V (y)
Rmax − x

,

(1)

is the probability that a new oﬀer y exceeds the retailer’s threshold price

T , given that the last oﬀer x did not exceed T . The outer maximization operator reflects
the choice that the consumer has after each unsuccessful oﬀer: to terminate the haggling
process or to submit an incremented oﬀer. The recursion (1) is complemented by the
boundary condition
V (R∗ ) = max (0, r − R∗ − c)

(2)

Expressions (1) and (2) define the consumer haggling problem. The recursion (1) can
be re-written in a more convenient form by introducing the new variable v = (R∗ − x)/c
and new value function L(v) = (Rmax − R∗ + vc) V (R∗ − vc) /c2 . Then, (1) becomes
L(v) = max (0, − (A + v) + M(v)) , M(v) = max ((v − u) (B + u) + L(u)) ,
0≤u≤v

(3)

with
A=

Rmax − R∗
r − R∗
,B =
.
c
c

(4)

Note that A, B ≥ 0, and AB = 0. The boundary condition (2) can be re-expressed as
L(0) = M(0) = 0.
Properties of the Optimal Solution
13

(5)

The dynamic program defined above does not have a well-defined horizon. This makes
it impossible to apply standard backward induction technique as in the case of the finitehorizon problems. For this reason, obtaining closed-form expression for the value function
is typically not feasible
However, the specific structure of (1)-(2) allows us to construct a closed form solution
in this particular setting. The building blocks for the optimal value function are presented
by the following family of recursive value functions.
Definition 1: For any n ∈ N, let Ln (v) = αn v2 + βn v + γn , where α0 = 0, β0 =
max(0, B − 1), γ0 = 0, and
αn =

n
1
n(n + 3)
, βn = B +
β0 − B −
,
2 (n + 1)
n+1
2

γn+1 = γn − A +

β0 − B −

n(n+3)
2

2(n + 2)(n + 1)

2

, n ∈ N.

(6)

Also, define
∗
= min (v|Ln+1 (v) ≥ Ln (v)) , n ∈ N, v0∗ = 0.
vn+1

(7)

Using (6), we can re-express (7) as:
∗
vn+1

=

1 + A + β0 − B +

n(n + 3)
1+
2

2

− A, n ∈ N.

(8)

The recursive family {Ln (v)} is directly related to the optimal consumer haggling strategy
as expressed by equations (3)-(5):
Proposition 1 (consumer haggling model):
√
√
∗
min
a) Let vmax = R −R
, z = vmax + A − 1 + A + β0 − B, and
c
n=

1 √
1 + 8z 2 − 1
2

= max n ∈ N|n ≤

1 √
1 + 8z 2 − 1
2

Then, the solution to the consumer haggling problem is given by

 Ln (v), v∗ ≤ z ≤ vmax ,
n
L∗ (v) =
 L (v), v∗ ≤ v ≤ v∗ , n = 0, ..., n − 1.
n

n

n+1

14

.

(9)

(10)

b) The optimal number of oﬀers made by a consumer is:

 n + 1, r > Rmax + c,
n∗ =
 n,
r≤R
+ c.

(11)

max

The values of optimal oﬀers can be computed as

 Rmin + ck(n−k+1) + (Rmax − Rmin )
2
∗
xk =
 R + ck(n−k+1) + (r − c − R )
min

min

2

k
n+1

, r > Rmax + c,

k
n+1

, r ≤ Rmax + c,

k = 1, ..., n, x∗n+1 = Rmax .

(12)

The closed-form expressions for the total number and the values of consumer oﬀers
(11)-(12) provide an important tool for the analysis of the consumer haggling behavior.
Numerical Example
To illustrate our notation as well as the consumer trade-oﬀ, consider a consumer of
type (5,100,200,200), corresponding to haggling cost c = 5, valuation r = 200, and initial
information [Rmin , Rmax ] = [100, 200]. In other words, the consumer incurs a disutility
equivalent to 5 Euro for every oﬀer she places, has seen a quoted price from another
channel for the same product at 200 Euro (or has a no-purchase utility of 200 Euro) and
expects the threshold price to be between 100 and 200 Euro.
Using our decision model (1)-(2), she would initially oﬀer x∗1 = 129. Assuming this
first oﬀer, as well as the following oﬀers were rejected by the retailer, the consumer would
subsequently make the following oﬀers: x∗2 = 153, x∗3 = 172 up to x∗4 = 185.25. If the last
oﬀer of 185.25 was not successful, it is optimal for the consumer to terminate the haggling
process, as the potential benefits (savings relative to 200) would not justify the additional
haggling eﬀort (n∗ = 4). This pattern is illustrated by Figure 2.
Now, compare this consumer with a consumer of equal characteristics, except a lower
haggling cost, c = 2. As can also be seen in Figure 2, the decrease in haggling cost
motivates the consumer to increase her haggling eﬀort, leading to smaller increments
between consecutive oﬀers. The overall haggling eﬀort, capturing the maximum number
of oﬀers the consumer would make prior to terminating the haggling process, increases to
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n∗ = 8. Finally, consider the impact of initial information on the haggling process. If the
consumer has a “sharper” prior about the threshold price (Rmin = 150 instead of 100), the
first oﬀer submitted by the consumer will be higher and n∗ decreases to 2.
Estimation of Consumer Characteristics
Instead of computing x∗i and n∗ for a given quadruplet of (c, Rmin , Rmax , r), we can
also use the mapping procedure in the opposite direction. In other words, upon observing
empirically a sequence of consumer oﬀers x1 to xL , where x1 is the first oﬀer and xL the
last, we can attempt to estimate the parameters (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) that best fit the observed
sequence. Consider for the moment only haggling processes that included four or more
oﬀers by the consumer. For illustrative purposes, Figure 3 provides two actual haggling
processes we observed at our research site. A comparison of the two sequences suggests
that the former comes from a consumer with lower Rmin and a higher c.
In general, we can search for the parameter quadruplet (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) that achieves
the best fit with the observed data by solving the following optimization problem:
L

min
c,Rmin ,Rmax ,r

i=1

xi − x∗i (c, Rmin , Rmax , r)

2

(13)

The optimization (13), which resembles the method of least squares in econometrics,
must be carried out under the constraint reflecting our knowledge about the number of
oﬀers the consumer placed. In particular, if the last oﬀer was rejected, and, thus, the
consumer opted out of the haggling process, the number of oﬀers we observe, L, is the
maximum number of oﬀers the consumer was willing to place, n∗ . Thus, we add the
following constraint on potential estimators (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) :
n∗ (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) = L.

(14)

If the last consumer oﬀer was accepted, L serves as the lower bound for the number of
oﬀers a consumer was willing to place, n∗ . In this case, the constraint becomes:
n∗ (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) ≥ L.

(15)

Our optimization approach allows us to reduce a sequence of oﬀers to four parameters.
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Validation of Consumer Model
To demonstrate that reducing the haggling sequences to a parameter quadruplet does
not lose too much of the underlying information, we can recompute the optimal haggling
sequence from the four parameters via the dynamic programming formulation and then
compare the resulting “predicted” oﬀers with the actual oﬀers. Figure 4a compares the
predicted values (vertical axis) with the actual oﬀers (horizontal axis) from our sample. A
perfect fit would correspond to a straight line through the origin and unit slope. A simple
regression analysis between actual and predicted values shows that 97.5% of the variance
in consumer behavior is captured by our model. Moreover, the slope of the corresponding
regression line is estimated as 1.01, thereby close to identity.
The length of the sequences ranges between 4 and 12. Given the ratio between parameters and observation, special attention is given to haggling sequences of length 7 and
longer. Limiting the regression analysis between actual and predicted oﬀers to haggling
sequences of length 7 or longer does not significantly change the corresponding fit (adj.
R2 at 97.0%).
Each of the haggling sequences we use for the validation of the consumer model provides
only a small number of data points. When assessing the fit of our consumer model, it is
important that we not only look at the absolute fit, but also compare the fit relative to
other models. To allow for such a relative comparison, we define two competing models
of consumer haggling. Unlike our consumer model outlined in Proposition 1, which is
based on rational consumer behavior and thereby exhibits a strong face validity, the two
competing models are “greedy” heuristics of consumer behavior.
• In the constant increment model, the consumer is defined by her first oﬀer, x1 , the
number of oﬀers she placed, N, and her last oﬀer, xN . Based on the triplet (x1 , N, xN )
N −x1
we predict the i-th oﬀer of the consumer as xi = x1 + i xN−1
. In other words, the

increments are evenly spaced between the first and the last oﬀer.
• In the population based increment model, the consumer is defined by her first oﬀer, x1 ,
and the number of oﬀers she placed, N. The model also uses the average increment of
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the consumer population ∆i for i = 1..N. We predict the i-th oﬀer of the consumer
as x1 = x1 and xi = xi−1 + ∆i . Thus, we calibrate the haggling sequence based on
the first oﬀer and the number of submitted oﬀers, but otherwise, assume that the
consumer behaves similar to the rest of the population.
Table 1 compares the explanatory power of these two models with our consumer model
defined by Proposition 1. The comparison between actual and predicted data is done
for the oﬀers (350, 390, 420, 440 for consumer X’s haggling for the PDA) as well as for
the increments (40, 30, 20). We look at all haggling sequences as well as the sub-sample
consisting of sequences with N ≥ 7. Note that oﬀers are easier to predict than increments,
as is reflected in the better fit of the validating regression analysis. Based on Table 1, we
can make the following observations. First, the fit of our model clearly dominates the fit
of the other two models. In all four cases, our model explains significantly more variance.
Second, we observe that our model is out-performing the relative comparisons especially
for the most diﬃcult validation setting: when predicting increments (opposed to absolute
oﬀers) for long haggling sequences (seven oﬀers and more), our model explains 52.4% of
the variance, while the comparison models only predict 21% and 16.5% respectively.
Taken together the good fit of our model with its face validity based on the consumer
decision problem described in Proposition 1, we will use this representation of consumer
behavior in our eﬀort to support the decision making of the NYOP retailer.

5

The Optimal Threshold Price

A retailer operating a NYOP site needs to set the threshold price T to maximize the
cumulative profit from all successful oﬀers. We assume that the wholesaler of the product
charges the retailer a wholesale price w. Moreover, we assume that the physical inventory
is owned entirely by the wholesaler and there exists no binding supply constraint. Both
assumptions were clearly fulfilled in the case we studied.
We assume that the consumer market consists of a number of consumer types each de18

scribed by a unique quadruple of parameters (c, Rmin , Rmax , r). In particular, assume that
haggling oﬀers coming from a consumer with parameters (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) are described
by Proposition 1. We begin our analysis by looking at a homogeneous consumer market
such that the parameters (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) are the same for all consumers. Following the
notation of the previous Section, we use n∗ and x = x∗n∗ to denote the optimal number
of oﬀers and the value of the highest oﬀer, respectively. We observe that x would be the
last oﬀer produced by a consumer if the threshold price T is set higher than x. For a
fixed threshold price level T ≤ x, define the index of the first oﬀer exceeding the threshold
price:
k(T ) = min (k|x∗k ≥ T )

(16)

If the threshold price is set at T , the revenue generated from a consumer is equal to the
smallest oﬀer, if such exists, exceeding T , x∗k(T ) . Consequently, it is optimal to equate the
threshold to the value of the highest potential oﬀer x. We summarize these observations
in the form of a Lemma:
Lemma (optimal threshold price in a homogeneous market):

Let w be the

wholesale price for the oﬀered product. The expected profit per consumer for a threshold
price T > w in a homogeneous market is given by


0,
for T > x,
Πh (T, w) =
 x∗ − w, for T ≤ x.
k(T )

(17)

Consequently, the profit maximizing threshold price T ∗ corresponds to the value of the

highest consumer oﬀer x.
The Lemma states that the highest oﬀer x = x∗n∗ determines the optimal threshold
price. It is clear, however, that the problem of maximizing (17) is degenerate, since
any threshold value in the interval between the second highest oﬀer and the highest one
(x∗n∗ −1 , x∗n∗ ] would generate the same profit. The Lemma assumes that w < x, i.e. the
wholesale price paid by the retailer is consistent with the consumer preference for the
product.
In a heterogeneous market, the optimal pricing problem is more complex. We consider a
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consumer market consisting of I groups, so that the i-th group, i = 1, ..., I, is characterized
i
i
by the set of parameters (ci , Rmin
, Rmax
, ri ) common for all members of the group. We also
I

assume that a consumer belongs to group i with a probability pi ,

pi = 1.
i=1

i
i
, Rmax
, ri ). Define
The consumer market is thus defined by a set of I vectors (pi , ci , Rmin

n∗i as the optimal number of oﬀers and xi = x∗n∗i as the highest oﬀer from a consumer
belonging to group i (without loss of generality, we assume that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xI ). In
addition, define x∗ik , i = 1, ..., I, k = 1, ..., n∗i as the k-th oﬀer from a customer in the i-th
group. Similarly to (16), we introduce
k i (T ) = min (k|x∗ik ≥ T )

(18)

For a wholesale price w, we introduce the smallest index of a group whose highest oﬀer
exceeds w:
i(w) = min(j|xj ≥ w).

(19)

Finally, for pairs of consumer groups i = 1, ..., I and j = i + 1, ..., I let xji be the lowest
oﬀer of group j exceeding the highest oﬀer xi of group i :
xji = x∗jkj (xi )

(20)

As suggested by the Lemma above, the threshold price in the case of a heterogeneous
market should be set to one of the highest oﬀers xi .
Proposition 2 (optimal threshold price in a heterogeneous market): The
expected profit per consumer for a wholesale price w and a threshold price T > w in a
heterogeneous market is given by



0,
for T > xI ,




 I
pj x∗jk (T ) − w , for xl < T ≤ xl+1 , l = i(w), ..., I − 1
Πn (T, w) =
j
j=l+1


I




pj x∗jk (T ) − w ,
for w < T ≤ xi(w) .

j

(21)

j=i(w)

Let

I

∗

j (w) = arg

max

j=i(w),...,I

pj (xj − w) +
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l=j+1

pl (xlj − w) .

(22)

Then, the profit-maximizing threshold price T ∗ is equal to xj ∗ (w) .
Proposition 2 states that selecting the optimal threshold price from the set of best
oﬀers from each consumer group requires a trade-oﬀ between potential profits in the event
that the consumer oﬀer exceeds the threshold and the probability of this event. Thus, a
lower threshold price will lead to a lower profit from a given consumer while increasing
the number of incidences in which oﬀers are accepted.
In Figure 5 we illustrate this trade-oﬀ for the case of I = 2 consumer groups such
that w < x1 < x2 . Assuming that a consumer belongs to group 1 with a probability
p1 and to group 2 with a probability p2 = 1 − p1 , we observe that the expected profit
under thresholds T = x1 and T = x2 is given by Πn (T = x1 ) = p1 x1 + p2 x21 − w and
Πn (T = x2 ) = p2 (x2 −w), respectively. Consequently, Πn (T = x1 ) ≥ Πn (T = x2 ) ⇔ p1 ≥
pc1 =

x2 −x21
.
x1 −w+x2 −x21

Thus, it is optimal to set the threshold at the level of the “lower” oﬀer

x1 , provided that the probability for a consumer to belong to group 1 is high enough. As
this probability drops below the critical level pc1 , it becomes optimal to switch the threshold
to the “higher” level x2 , thus lowering the probability of the “buy” event in anticipation
of much higher potential profits. We note that the “switching” probability level pc1 is an
increasing function of the wholesale price w, so that higher wholesale prices increase the
importance of the “higher oﬀer” class, inducing higher optimal threshold values.
Validation Procedure for the Optimal Threshold Price
We can use the transaction data we collected from the German NYOP retailer to test
the performance of the optimal threshold price derived above. In our analysis, we assumed
that each haggling sequence was generated by a consumer belonging to a distinct consumer
group.
Unlike in the validation of our consumer model, where we used the entire sample to
assess the goodness of fit, an evaluation of the optimal threshold price requires a diﬀerent
approach. Choosing a threshold price which performs better than the one chosen by our
research site ex-post would be of little value in improving the actual decision making.
For this reason, we divided the haggling sequences for each product into two equal or
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nearly equal sub-samples. The first sub-sample (calibration sample) was used to generate
consumer types and to calibrate the decision rules. The calibration sample consisted of the
50% of the haggling sequences the NYOP retailer received first and was used to estimate
the parameters of the consumer population. The second sub-sample (hold-out sample)
was used as a testing ground for the decision rules. Dividing the sample based on arrival
time opposed to a random split allows us to retrospectively recreate the managerial setting
as faced by the management of the NYOP retailer.
In the calibration sample, we used each completed haggling sequence to compute the
parameter triplet (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) that achieved the best fit as defined by (13). The
resulting parameter quadruplets were used to characterize consumer groups and to support
the optimization for the threshold price as outlined in Proposition 2. For example, in the
case of the PDA, NP1 DA = 23 consumer groups were selected to reflect this consumer
market.
Haggling sequences in the hold-out sample were used to create hold-out consumers
following the ex-post classification approach described in the validation section. Assuming
equal probabilities across consumer groups, we then randomly drew “virtual” consumers
from the hold-out population and created haggling sequences using Proposition 1. For
each sequence, we can establish its contribution to retailer profits for a given threshold
price. The advantage of working with virtual consumers, opposed to the actual oﬀers
we collected, is as follows. Consider a consumer, who placed oﬀers (in Euro) 180 and
195 unsuccessfully, yet achieved a successful oﬀer in the third round for 201. Assume
that the threshold price was at T = 200. This sequence of observed oﬀers is endogenous
with respect to the threshold price: if the threshold price had been T = 205, the third
oﬀer would have been unsuccessful and we can only speculate if the consumer might have
incremented her third oﬀer further. Thus, when evaluating the performance of a decision
rule diﬀerent from the one that was actually used at our research site, it is important to
analyze consumers at the level of their consumer characteristics (c, Rmin , Rmax , r) opposed
to working with their actual oﬀers, xi . Given the good ex-post fit of our model (see Figure
4), little information is distorted this way.
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Validation Results for the Optimal Threshold Price
Table 2 illustrates the performance of the our optimal threshold pricing rule. The
second and third column summarize the threshold price used by our research site and
the corresponding profits. The third and fourth column present threshold and profits
computed based on Proposition 2. The relative profit improvements from the policies
recommended by our static thresholds are sizable: 10% for DVD-Player, 11% CD-Rewriter,
and a notable 72% for the PDA. We observe that for all three products, Proposition 2
recommended a higher threshold price than what was used in practice.
To validate this pattern, we computed the ex-post optimal threshold and the corresponding profits (last two columns in Table 2). While such a number does not reflect the
decision situation as faced by our research site (it uses information that was only available in hind-sight), it does provide an upper bound on profits. A comparison between
the actual threshold, the threshold suggested by Proposition 2, and the ex-post optimal
threshold reveals that our results indeed come much closer to this ex-post optimal solution.
Comparison to Posted Prices
In addition to validating our optimal threshold prices of Proposition 2, we can also
use the estimates of consumer characteristics to compute the optimal posted price and
the corresponding profits. Towards this end, we use the valuations we estimated for the
consumers in the calibration sample to create a demand curve and then compute the
optimal posted price for a given wholesale price w.
For the DVD player, we obtain an optimal posted price of 246 Euro and a resulting
profit of 13.32. For the PDA, the optimal posted price is 207 (profits of 8.61) and for the
CD-RW the optimal posted price is 166 (profits of 5.97).
Based on these results, we observe that for one out of the three products, the profits
obtained based on haggling exceeded the profits the retailer would have obtained from
posting prices. The intuition for this result is as follows: if the market is very heterogeneous
and there exists a market segment with high haggling costs and high product valuations,
not posting prices allows the NYOP retailer to obtain a substantial profit from a few
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customers. This compensates for the overall ineﬃciencies that haggling creates for the
entire consumer population. The comparison between profits under haggling vs. profits
under posted prices is formalized in Proposition 3. Unfortunately, providing analytical
results for any number of customer types is not possible, and we have to limit our analysis
to the special case of two consumer groups.
1
1
2
2
Define two groups of consumers, (p1 , c1 , Rmin
, Rmax
, r1 ) and (p2 , c2 , Rmin
, Rmax
, r2 ). Here

pi , i = 1, 2 expresses the probability that a consumer belongs to group i with characteristics
i
i
1
2
(ci , Rmin
, Rmax
, ri ), p1 + p2 = 1. To simplify analysis, we assume Rmin
= Rmin
= 0,
1
2
= r1 , Rmax
= r2 . Without loss of generality, we assume that r2 > r1 . Then, we the
Rmax

following general result can be obtained with respect to relative profit values under fixed
pricing vs. haggling:
Proposition 3 (Posted prices vs. haggling)
Let

r2√
4+2 3

< c2 ≤

r2
4

and w +

p2 r2
2p1

< r1 <

r2
.
2

Then there exists a threshold value of the

frictional cost c∗1 > 0 such that for any 0 < c1 < c∗1 optimal haggling profits Πh are higher
than the optimal fixed-price profits Πf .
To illustrate the intuition of Proposition 3, consider a retailer facing the following
1
1
2
2
two groups: (p1 , c1 , Rmin
, Rmax
, r1 ) = (0.995, 0.01, 0, 101, 101) and (p2 , c2 , Rmin
, Rmax
, r2 ) =

(0.005, 50, 0, 300, 300). Let the wholesale price be w = 100. Given the reservation prices
of both groups, the best posted price would be at R = 300 which would lead to expected
profits of Πf = (R − w) p2 = 1. We can compute the maximum oﬀers that each consumer
group would be willing to submit in a haggling situation as x1 = 100.974 and x2 = 150
(because of high haggling costs, consumers of the second group actually place only one
oﬀer at 150). Setting a static threshold at T = x1 , the retailer earns an expected profit
of Πh = (x1 − w) p1 + (x2 − w) p2 = 0.974 × 0.995 + 50 × 0.005 = 1.219 > Πf . Thus, we
observe that in a market of strong heterogeneity concerning reservation prices as well as
haggling costs, haggling can lead to higher profits than posted prices.
While profits for the CD-Rewriter exceeded the optimal posted price profits, the corresponding diﬀerence was relatively small. Moreover, for the other two products we observed
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that posted price profits clearly dominated profits under haggling. Thus, at first sight it
seems that posted prices are more profitable than haggling. However, this ignores one very
important element of our research setting discussed in Section 2. The role of the NYOP
retailer is not to provide the primary sales channel for the wholesaler, but to allow a set of
customers, who currently abstain from purchasing, to obtain the product at a lower price.
The haggling format allows the wholesaler to minimize the cannibalization of the existing
retail channel as no price is ever posted. Consequently, haggling enables the retailer to
price discriminate in two diﬀerent forms:
• It lies in the nature of haggling that customers who are willing to invest more haggling eﬀort are able to achieve a better transaction price. As long as haggling costs
are mildly correlated with the consumer’s willingness to pay, this creates price discrimination within the population of customers interacting with the NYOP retailer
(Proposition 3).
• Using an NYOP retailer allows the wholesaler to segment the overall consumer population into a conventional retail channel with posted prices and a haggling channel
for customers with a lower willingness to pay. This creates price discrimination
across channels. For the products we analyzed, we found that the threshold prices
used by the NYOP retailer were substantially lower than typical posted prices in
traditional retail channels.

6

Design of Haggling Mechanism

In the context we study, the NYOP retailer is able to influence the haggling cost of a consumer by choosing the time delay with which a consumer is notified about an unsuccessful
oﬀer. If a consumer received instantaneous feed-back on her oﬀer, she would incur less
eﬀort following an incremental search strategy compared to a one day delay. Thus, the
retailer is able to scale the consumer’s frictional costs upwards or downwards.
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Proposition 4 (Design of Haggling Mechanism): a) The optimal number of oﬀers,
n∗ , is a non-increasing function of c. In particular, the consumer engages in haggling if
and only if her haggling cost c does not exceed the critical value c0 =

(r−Rmin )2
.
2(Rmax −Rmin )

b) For valuation r , and prior information [Rmax , Rmin ] such that r ≤ Rmax + c, define
ci = min(c|n∗ (c) = i), i ∈ N

(23)

and let x(c) = x∗n∗ (c) denote the highest consumer oﬀer. Then, x(c) < x(c = 0) =
min (r, Rmax ) for any c > 0, and
∂x(c)
≥ 0, ci+1 < c < ci ,
∂c
lim x(c) > x(ci ), i ∈ N.

c→ci −0

(24)

As indicated by Proposition 4a, a consumer with a higher product valuation will be
willing to accept a higher per-round haggling cost c to engage in haggling with the NYOP
retailer. Similarly, a consumer with a higher perceived upper bound for the threshold
price, Rmax , will be less willing to accept a high cost of haggling. Note that the influence
of the Rmin on c0 is diﬀerent from that of r and Rmax . In particular, as Rmin grows for fixed
Rmax and r, two trends are at work. On the one hand, growing Rmin indicates that the
expected bargain value associated with buying from the NYOP retailer is decreasing. On
the other hand, as [Rmin , Rmax ] “shrinks”, the uncertainty of that value also diminishes,
and the perceived eﬀort of identifying the threshold is reduced. For small values of Rmin
(Rmin < 2Rmax − r) the first trend is more pronounced, and the growth of Rmin results in
the decline in the participation barrier
trend dominates, resulting in

∂c0
∂Rmin

∂c0
∂Rmin

< 0 . For larger values of Rmin , the second

> 0.

We observe from Proposition 4b that the value of the highest potential oﬀer made by
a consumer exhibits an interesting non-monotone behavior with respect to her haggling
cost c. Small changes in c typically do not influence the optimal number of oﬀers. Thus,
for a small increase in haggling cost the consumer will make a more “aggressive” (higher)
terminal oﬀer. However, a larger increase in c can lead to the “loss” of an oﬀer (a decrease
in n∗ ). In this case, the value of the highest bid can actually decrease, reflecting the
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willingness of a consumer to terminate the haggling process “earlier”. Note that, despite
such non-monotonicity, the largest value of the last oﬀer is observed when the cost of
haggling decreases to zero. In this case, the highest oﬀer submitted by a consumer reflects
either her estimate of Rmax or her product valuation r, whichever is smaller.
The result that the NYOP retailer can “squeeze” a maximum surplus out of the consumer if haggling costs are decreased is certainly counter-intuitive. At first glance, we
would expect that the additional flexibility for the consumer to increment her oﬀer with
little eﬀort should move surplus from the retailer to the consumer. To better understand
why a low haggling cost puts the consumer at a disadvantage, consider the case where
haggling costs are suﬃciently high so that the consumer only submits one oﬀer. Upon
receiving the oﬀer, the NYOP retailer is in a position in which it is optimal to accept
every oﬀer above the wholesale price w. Because of the high cost of haggling, the buyer
has a credible commitment that her oﬀer will not be further incremented. If, however,
haggling is made easier for the consumer, the consumer loses this opportunity of credibly
committing herself to not increment her oﬀer, which is in the advantage of the NYOP
retailer. Thus, lower haggling cost allows for a higher granularity in implementing the
price discrimination method.
As haggling costs approach zero, in the limit the haggling channel resembles posted
prices. However, interpreting this limiting case deserves some further discussion. First,
the limiting case is a purely hypothetical case, as haggling would always require some
minimum eﬀort of the consumer, most importantly reflecting the consumer’s disutility of
keying in information. Second, as indicated by Proposition 3, under certain conditions,
haggling may actually generate higher profits than posted prices. Third, our analysis only
focuses on the eﬀect that changes in haggling eﬀort have on the NYOP channel in isolation.
If haggling becomes too easy, it is likely that other consumers, who are currently using the
posted price channel switch to the NYOP channel. Thus, while from the perspective of the
NYOP retailer small haggling costs are desirable, the wholesaler is likely to be concerned
with the cannibalization of the existing channels.
The Role of Electronic Agents
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Many industry experts predict that electronic agents will soon dramatically decrease
the consumer’s haggling costs. Proposition 4 allows us to predict some of the consequences of electronic agents, both from the perspective of the consumer, as well as from
the perspective of the NYOP retailer. Everything else constant, electronic agents will be
advantageous to the consumer. One could imagine that the electronic agent knows its
principal’s three parameters Rmin , Rmax ,and r as well as her payment information. This
would leave the consumer without any interaction with the retailer.
For any static threshold price, early adopters of electronic agents would gain the most
as they are able to negotiate the lowest price for them without having to incur the actual
haggling eﬀort. As electronic agents become more widely used, the retailer is likely to
respond. Specifically, if electronic agents are widely adopted, the retailer might abandon
any price discrimination strategy and move to fixed pricing.
Another possible response to electronic consumer agents is for the retailer to delay the
response to submitted oﬀers. If every round of haggling would take a day, haggling would
be costly to the consumer, even if it would not require actual eﬀort. In this scenario, the
electronic agent would have to trade-oﬀ response time to the principal with the principal’s
desire for an attractive price. Thus, price-discrimination based on haggling is sustainable
if the NYOP retailer chooses an appropriate response-time.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we presented a model of online haggling between a NYOP retailer and a
set of consumers. While investing eﬀort in haggling is wasteful from a welfare perspective,
it does allow both retailer and wholesaler to engage in a finer market segmentation. The
wholesaler uses a NYOP retailer as an additional channel to serve parts of the consumer
population who is not willing to purchase the product at the posted price. Similarly, the
NYOP retailer is able to engage in price discrimination within the set of consumers who
visit his web-site: customers who are willing to haggle extensively (low c in our model)
are - on average - obtaining the product at a lower price, as they are able to erode the
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NYOP retailer’s information rent further than consumers who only submit a few oﬀers
(higher c in our model). Thus, an NYOP channel allows the wholesaler to increase profits,
compared to selling only at a posted price.
We began our analysis by looking at the consumer’s decision problem, trading-oﬀ haggling eﬀort with price savings. We model this trade-oﬀ as a search problem. The analytical
solutions we derive (Proposition 1) explain more than 97% of the variance in the oﬀers
submitted by consumers and 66% of the variance in oﬀer increments. The fact that consumers follow such a predictable pattern in their haggling policy benefits the retailer.
After collecting data about consumer characteristics, the retailer can use the results of
Proposition 2 to optimally set her threshold price. Based on the empirical transaction
data we collected from our research site, we found that the threshold price we derive this
way improves profits of the NYOP retailer substantially.
In addition to the tactical problem of choosing an appropriate threshold price, we also
analyzed the more strategic question to what extent the NYOP retailer should support
the haggling eﬀort of the consumer. Such changes in haggling eﬀort can be achieved by
adjusting the time the retailer takes to inform a consumer about the outcome of her oﬀer
or by the design of the interface itself. Counter to initial intuition, we find that lowering
haggling costs may actually hurt the consumer, as it eliminates her opportunity to credibly
commit towards not incrementing her oﬀer. We also compare the optimal threshold price
with the optimal posted price. We find that under some conditions, haggling can lead to
higher profits compared to posted prices. However, the main advantage of the haggling
model is not that it out-performs posted pricing within a channel, but that it provides
the wholesaler an opportunity to reach customers who currently abstain from purchasing.
Developing an integrated, multi-channel strategy for the wholesaler, including a joint
optimization across channels would be an interesting extension of our research.
A second opportunity for future research lies in extending our analysis of the NYOP
retailer’s decision rule of which oﬀers to accept. The focus of our model is one of decision
support for the NYOP retailer, not of developing an equilibrium model of bargaining.
Future research is needed to derive equilibrium models for the bargaining process between
29

the NYOP retailer and a set of heterogenous consumers. This is an especially challenging
task, if the NYOP retailer would be allowed to change the threshold price over the course
of a haggling sequence.
Finally, future research is needed to better understand the impact of electronic agents
on haggling in a NYOP context. Electronic agents would reduce haggling eﬀort for the
consumer, yet, due to the response delay of the retailer, not entirely. Moreover, as discussed
in conjunction with Proposition 4, a reduction in haggling eﬀort is not necessarily in the
interest of consumers. However, as long as only few consumers have access to electronic
agents, their usage would allow a consumer with high haggling costs to behave as if she
were a consumer with low haggling costs, i.e., by following small increments in her oﬀers.
Thus, it would be interesting to study how haggling would change in a population where
some consumers use electronic agents, while others still haggle manually.
In summary, we believe that online haggling - while not replacing posted prices - will
become a common element of online business transactions. Understanding the underlying
theory and its potential application thus becomes of fundamental importance for online
retailers and management scholars alike.4
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1: For the proof of the statements of Proposition 1 we need two
addtional results:
∗
∗
Lemma A1: For n ∈ N, (n + 1)vn−1
− nvn∗ ≤ n (βn−1 − B) ≤ nvn+1
− (n + 1)vn∗ .
∗
Proof: We start with the inequality (n + 1)vn−1
− nvn∗ ≤ n (βn−1 − B). Using (6) and
√
(8), this is equivalent to 1 + A + β0 − B × (n + 1) 1 + (n−2)(n+1)
− n 1 + (n−1)(n+2)
2
2

0, which is satisfied for any n ∈ N, since the expression in brackets is non-positive and
1 + β0 − B = max (0, 1 − B) ≥ 0.
∗
Similarly, n (βn−1 − B) ≤ nvn+1
− (n + 1)vn∗ is equivalent to β0 − B − (n2 + n − 2) ≤

√
1 + A + β0 − B n 1 +

n(n+3)
2

− (n + 1) 1 +

(n−1)(n+2)
2

which is true for any n ∈ N,

since the left-hand side here is non-positive and the right-hand side is non-negative. 
∗
Lemma A2: For n ∈ N, vn∗ ≤ v ≤ vn+1
,

Ln (v) = − (A + v) +

max

∗
∗
vn−1
≤u≤vn

((v − u) (B + u) + Ln−1 (u)) .

∗
vn+1
= min v| ∗max ((v − u) (B + u) + Ln (u)) ≥
vn ≤u≤v

max

∗
∗
vn−1
≤u≤vn

(25)

((v − u) (B + u) + Ln−1 (u)) .
(26)

Proof: Using (6), we establish after some algebra that
Ln (v) = − (A + v) + max ((v − u) (B + u) + Ln−1 (u)) , n ∈ N
u∈R

32

(27)

≤

Introducing
v + βn−1 − B
,
u∈R
2 (1 − αn−1 )

∗

v∗ ,
ugn−1 ≤ vn−1
,


 n−1
∗
uln−1 (v) = arg ∗ max ∗ ((v − u) (B + u) + Ln−1 (u)) =
ugn−1 , vn−1
≤ ugn−1 ≤ vn∗(28)
vn−1 ≤u≤vn



 ∗
vn ,
vn∗ ≤ ugn−1 ,
ugn−1 (v) = arg max ((v − u) (B + u) + Ln−1 (u)) =

for n ∈ N, we observe that in order for (25) to be valid, we need to show that vn∗ ≤
∗
∗
v ≤ vn+1
implies vn−1
≤ ugn−1 (v) ≤ vn∗ . Using the result of Lemma A1 and (28), we
∗
∗
obtain vn−1
≤ ugn−1 (vn∗ ) and ugn−1 (vn+1
) ≤ vn∗ . Combining this with the observation that
∂ugn−1 (v)
∂v

=

1
2(1−αn−1 )

> 0, we get (25). Finally, (26) follows from (7) and (25).

We start the proof of Proposition 1 from the statement in part a). We note that (8)
∗
implies that for n defined in (9), vn∗ ≤ vmax < vn+1
. Below we demonstrate that the function

(10) is a solution to (3) for 0 ≤ v ≤ vmax . Indeed, consider first the interval 0 ≤ v ≤ v1∗ .
For any v from this interval, we have L∗ (v) = L0 (v). Let us assume that A > 0, B = 0.
Then, according to (6), L0 (v) = 0, and max0≤u≤v ((v − u) (B + u) + L0 (u)) =

v2
4

≤A+v

for v ≤ v1∗ , so that max (0, − (A + v) + max0≤u≤v ((v − u) (B + u) + L0 (u))) = 0 = L0 (v).
The same result is obtained for A = 0, B < 1. For B ≥ 1, we get, according to (6) and
(8), max0≤u≤v ((v − u) (B + u) + L0 (u)) = vB, and, as before,
max (0, − (A + v) + max0≤u≤v ((v − u) (B + u) + L0 (u))) = (B − 1) v = L0 (v). Fur∗
ther, for vn∗ ≤ v ≤ vn+1
, n = 1, ..., n − 1,

max ((v − u) (B + u) + L∗ (u))

0≤u≤v

= max
=

max ((v − u) (B + u) + L0 (u)) , ..., ∗max ((v − u) (B + u) + Ln (u))

0≤u≤v1∗

max

∗
∗
vn−1
≤u≤vn

vn ≤u≤v

((v − u) (B + u) + Ln−1 (u))

(29)

where we have used (26). Thus,
− (A + v) + max ((v − u) (B + u) + L∗ (u))
0≤u≤v

= − (A + v) +

max

∗
∗
vn−1
≤u≤vn

((v − u) (B + u) + Ln−1 (u)) = Ln (v) = L∗ (v)
33

(30)

∗
∗
for vn∗ ≤ v ≤ vn+1
. Similarly, for vn∗ ≤ v ≤ vmax < vn+1
,

− (A + v) + max ((v − u) (B + u) + L∗ (u)) = Ln (v) = L∗ (v).

(31)

0≤u≤v

Turning to part b), we first would like to express the optimal bidding sequence in the
notation compatible with the definition of the recursive family {Ln (v)}. In particular, we
would like to show that the optimal number of oﬀers made by a consumer whose decision
model is expressed by (3)-(5) is given by

 n,
B < 1,
n∗ =
 n + 1, B ≥ 1,

(32)

and the optimal sequence of oﬀers is given by

 {b∗ , ..., b∗ } ,
B < 1,
n
1
b∗ =
 {b∗ , b∗ , ..., b∗ } , B ≥ 1,
n
0 1

(33)

where

b∗k =

kvmax k (n − k + 1)
k
−
+ (β0 − B + 1) 1 −
, k = 1, ..., n, b∗0 = 0.
n+1
2
n+1

(34)

In order to establish (32)-(34), we note that in the beginning of the haggling process, a
consumer evaluates L (vmax ) and the optimal first oﬀer is given by
b∗n = arg

max

∗
∗
vn−1
≤u≤vn

vmax + βn−1 − B
,
2 (1 − αn−1 )

((vmax − u) (B + u) + Ln−1 (u)) =

∗
where we have used (25) and the fact that vn−1
≤

v+βn−1 −B
2(1−αn−1 )

(35)

∗
≤ vn∗ for vn∗ ≤ v ≤ vn+1
.

Utilizing (6), we get
b∗n

nvmax + β0 − B −
vmax + βn−1 − B
=
=
2 (1 − αn−1 )
n+1

(n−1)(n+2)
2

.

(36)

If the first oﬀer b∗n is rejected, a consumer establishes the value of the next oﬀer b∗n−1 by eval∗
∗
∗
uating L(b∗n ). Since vn−1
≤ b∗n ≤ vn∗ , b∗n−1 = arg maxvn−2
((b∗n − u) (B + u) + Ln−2 (u)) =
≤u≤vn−1
b∗n +βn−2 −B
2(1−αn−2 )

=

(n−1)b∗n +β0 −B− (n−2)(n+1)
2
.
n

In the same fashion, b∗k =

kb∗k+1 +β0 −B−
k+1

(k−1)(k+2)
2

,k =

1, ..., n − 1.Using this result recursively, we get
b∗k =

kvmax
+k
n+1

1
1
+ ... +
(β0 − B) −
k(k + 1)
n(n + 1)

34

εk
εn
+ ... +
,
k(k + 1)
n(n + 1)
(37)

where εk =

(k−1)(k+2)
.
2

b∗k =

Since

1
k(k+1)

=

1
k

−

1
k+1

and

εk
k(k+1)

=

1
2

+

1
k+1

− k1 , (37) becomes

kvmax k (n − k + 1)
k
−
+ (β0 − B + 1) 1 −
.
n+1
2
n+1

(38)

We note that v0∗ = 0 ≤ b∗1 ≤ v1∗ . Thus, if B < 1, L (b∗1 ) = 0, which implies that if oﬀer
b∗1 is rejected, a consumer terminates the haggling process. On the other hand, if B ≥ 1,
L (b∗1 ) = (B − 1)b∗1 > 0, and an extra oﬀer b∗0 = 0 is placed.
Finally, the above results are easily converted into the original notation used in (1) and
(2). In particular, the parameter z which defines the optimal number of oﬀers made by a
consumer characterized by the quadruplet (c, Rmax , Rmin , r) can be re-expressed as

 Rmax −Rmin ,
r > Rmax + c,
c
z=
 Rmax −Rmin − c+Rmax −r r ≤ R
+ c,
c

(39)

max

c

To avoid degenerate cases, we limit ourselves to those cases where the consumer engages

in haggling, which requires r > Rmin + c. This, in turn, implies non-negativity of z in (39).
The values of optimal oﬀers are then given by x∗k = R∗ − cb∗n−k+1 , k = 1, ..., n + 1, which
reduces to (12).
Proof of Proposition 2: We start by observing that (21) is a generalization of (17) for
the case of a non-homogeneous consumer market: the generated profit is a weighted sum of
profit values generated by each consumer group, and, for a given threshold value, the profit
contribution of a particular group is equal to the smallest oﬀer exceeding the threshold
minus the wholesale price w. According to (18), x∗jk

j (T )

is a non-decreasing function of

T , and, therefore, T = xl dominates in terms of generated profits any threshold from the
interval (xl−1 , xl ] for all l = i(w), ..., I. Thus, the optimal threshold price should be equal to
one of the highest consumer oﬀers xi . Comparison between Πn (T = xj ) for j = i(w), ..., I
leads to (22).
Proof of Proposition 3: The optimal value of the fixed-price profits Πf can be
computed as
Πf = max (r1 − w, p2 (r2 − w)) .

(40)

On the other hand, if haggling is used, the value of the frictional cost for consumers
belonging to the second group is such that they only make a single bid at
35

r2
.
2

Under

this conditions, the best haggling profit is obtained by setting the haggling threshold at
T = x1 , where x1 is the highest bid made by consumer of the first group. The optimal
value of the haggling profit is
Πh = p1 (x1 − w) + p2

r2
−w .
2

For the analysis below, it is convenient to define z(c1 ) =

x (c1 ) =

c1
2

1
2

r1
c1

1 + 8z 2 (c1 ) − 1 − 1 + (r1 − c1 ) 1 −

(41)
− 1 and
2
1 + 8z 2 (c1 ) − 1

(42)

Note that x (c1 ) is a continuous function of c1 , and, according to the results of Proposition
1, for c1 > 0,

x(c1 ) < x1 < r1 ,

(43)

lim x(c1 ) = r1 .

(44)

while
c1 →0

Given the continuity of x (c1 ) and the limit value (42), there exist c > 0 such that
p1 (x(c1 ) − w) + p2
r1 − w >

p2 r2
2p1

r2
2

− w > r1 − w for all 0 < c1 < c. Now, since our assumption

is equivalent to p1 (r1 − w) + p2

r2
2

− w > p2 (r2 − w), by the same ar-

gument as above, there exists c > 0 such that p1 (x(c1 ) − w) + p2

r2
2

− w > p2 (r2 − w)

for all 0 < c1 < c. Selecting c∗1 = min(c, c), and using (43), we get the statement of the
Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4: a) Due to monotone relation between n and z, as indicated by (9), it is suﬃcient to prove that the statement of the Proposition applies to
z. The monotonicity of z with respect to r and Rmin directly follows from (39). Furmax −Rmin 1
ther, considering the only non-trivial case of r ≤ Rmax + c, we get ∂z
= Rc+R
3
∂c
max −r 2c 2
√
max −r
× √RRmax
− c + Rmax − r < 0, since the expression in the brackets is a decreasing
−Rmin

function of c and it is negative for smallest possible values of c no matter whether r ≤ Rmax
or r ≥ Rmax . Clearly, as (11) indicates, for r > Rmax + c a consumer places at least 1 oﬀer
(the highest one equal to Rmax ). If, however, r ≤ Rmax + c, a consumer participates in the
36

auction if and only if n ≥ 1. This last condition is equivalent, according to (9), to z ≥ 1.
Using (39), we have

Rmax −Rmin
c

c+Rmax −r
c

−

≥1⇔c≤

(r−Rmin )2
.
2(Rmax −Rmin )

b) Using (9) and (39), we observe that lim n(c) = +∞, and lim cn(c) = 0. Thus,
c→0

c→0

x(0) = min (r, Rmax ). Considering the only non-trivial case of r ≤ Rmax + c, we get
r − Rmin − c − cz 2
cn (n + 1)
1
r − Rmin − c −
≥
x(0) − x(c) ≥
n+1
2
n+1
√
√
√
2 c + Rmax − r Rmax − Rmin − c + Rmax − r
> 0,
=
n+1

(45)

since, by assumption, r > Rmin + c.
For ci+1 < c < ci , i ∈ N, the optimal number of oﬀers n∗ = n remains unchanged, and
according to (12),

∂x(c)
∂c

limc→ci −0 x(c) = Rmin +
Rmin )

i
i+1

=

∂x∗n
∂c

ci (i+1)
2

=

n
2

−

n
n+1

=

n(n−1)
2(n+1)

+ (r − ci − Rmin )

, so that limc→ci −0 x(c) − x(ci ) =

ci
2
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+

≥ 0. In the neighborhood of ci we get

i+1
i+2

, and x(ci ) = Rmin +

(r−ci −Rmin )
(i+2)(i+1)

> 0.

ici
2

+ (r − ci −

Enter ID

Place bid Xi

Y

Xi>T

Transaction
occurs
at price Xi

N

Place new
bid Xi; i++

Consumer
informed that
Xi was too low

Y

Increment?

N

Consumer
abandons

Figure 1: Description of consumer model

Empirical Bidding behavior

Imputed Consumer characteristics
€
(c=6.4,r=195,Rmin=109,Rmax=168.5)

€
(c=2.1,r=212.5,Rmin=133.5,Rmax=194)
100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190
Figure 3: Estimating consumer attributes based on observed offers

Dependent
variable in
validation
regression
Increments

Length of
haggling
sequences

Increments

N*≥7

Offers

N*≥4

Offers

N*≥7

N*≥4

Constant
increment
model
Adj.R2 47.5%
1.00
β1
Adj.R2 21%
1.00
β1
2
Adj.R 95.2%
0.95
β1
2
Adj.R 93.1%
0.88
β1

Population
typical
increments

Consumer
search model
(Proposition 1)

17.5%
1.03
16.5%
0.89
74.9%
0.62
77.2%
0.69

66.4%
1.01
52.4%
1.01
97.5%
1.02
97.0%
0.94

Table 1: Validation of the consumer model based on a regression model
Actuali=β0+β1 Predictedi+εi

Predicted
Offers, €

250
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150

100

50

0
0

50
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Actual
Offers, €

Figure 4: Model validation by comparing actual bids with predicted offer

Product

Actual
Threshold

Actual Profit

Static
Threshold

Profit under static
Threshold

Ex-post optimal
Threshold

DVD-Player

208

9.40

247

10.23

231

Ex-post
optimal
Profit
13.07

PDA

193

4.96

220

8.54

237

9.58

CD-Rewriter

144

5.41

160

6.02

153

6.55

Table 2. Profit per consumer (in €) for different static pricing rules.

x̂21

x̂1

a)

x̂2
Π n (T = xˆ2 ) = p2 ( xˆ2 − w)

Π n (T = xˆ1 ) = p1 xˆ1 + p2 xˆ21 − w

b)
0

T * = x̂2

T * = x̂1

p1 ≤ p1c

p1 ≥ p1c

p1c =

1

xˆ2 − xˆ21
xˆ1 − w + xˆ2 − xˆ21

Figure 5: Non-homogeneous consumer market consisting of 2 groups: (a) expected profits (per
consumer) for two competing threshold values; (b) optimal threshold as a function of the probability
that a consumer belongs to the 1st group.

